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Abstract
This paper analyzes the problem of a benevolent planner wishing to control a population of 
heterogeneous agents subject to idiosyncratic shocks. This is equivalent to a deterministic 
control problem in which the state variable is the cross-sectional distribution. We show 
how, in continuous time, this problem can be broken down into a dynamic programming 
equation plus the law of motion of the distribution, and we introduce a new numerical 
algorithm to solve it. As an application, we analyze the constrained-effi cient allocation of an 
Aiyagari economy with a fat-tailed wealth distribution. We fi nd that the constrained-effi cient 
allocation features more wealth inequality than the competitive equilibrium.
Keywords:  Kolmogorov forward equation, wealth distribution, social welfare function, mean 
fi eld control.
JEL classifi cation: C6, D3, D5, E2.
Resumen
Este artículo analiza el problema de un planifi cador benevolente que desea controlar una 
población de agentes heterogéneos sujetos a perturbaciones idiosincrásticas. Esto es
equivalente a un problema de control determinista en el que la variable de estado pertinente 
es la distribución de agentes. Demostramos cómo, trabajando en tiempo continuo, este 
problema puede descomponerse en una ecuación de programación dinámica junto a la 
ley de movimiento de la distribución y presentamos un nuevo algoritmo para resolverlo 
numéricamente. Como aplicación, analizamos la solución efi ciente-restringida de una 
economía à la Aiyagari con una distribución de la riqueza que replica la observada en los 
datos. Nuestros resultados indican que la solución óptima se caracteriza por un nivel de 
desigualdad de la riqueza mayor que el observado en el equilibrio competitivo.
Palabras clave: ecuación de Kolmogorov, distribución de la riqueza, función de bienestar 
social, control óptimo.
Códigos JEL: C6, D3, D5, E2.
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1 Introduction
Optimal control is an essential tool in economics and finance. In optimal control, a planner
determines the evolution of a vector of control variables in order to maximize a certain optimality
criterion. The state of the system is typically characterized by a finite number of state variables.1
Some systems of interest are nevertheless composed of a very large number of heterogeneous agents;
an economy, for example, is composed of millions of different households and firms and a network
may contain thousands of nodes. In these cases, assuming a continuous distribution of state
variables seems to be a reasonable approximation to the real problem under consideration.
The aim of this paper is to analyze optimal control problems in which there is a continuum of
heterogeneous agents. The state of each of these agents is characterized by a finite set of variables
which follow a controllable stochastic process, that is, there exists a vector of controls that allows
the planner to modify the individual states. The state dynamics also depend on the evolution of
a set of aggregate variables. We consider a benevolent social planner who maximizes an aggregate
welfare criterion.
We focus on the continuous time version of the problem. The key feature of working in con-
tinuous time is that the evolution of the state distribution across agents can be characterized by
a partial differential equation (PDE) known as the Kolmogorov forward (KF) equation.2 Despite
the random evolution of each individual state, the dynamics of the distribution are deterministic
due to the Law of Large Numbers. Thanks to this, the control of an infinite number of agents
subject to idiosyncratic shocks can be analyzed as the control of a deterministic distribution that
evolves according to the KF equation, subject to the aggregate −or market clearing− conditions.
The main contribution of the paper is to present the necessary conditions for a solution to
this problem. These conditions are characterized by a system of two coupled PDEs, the planner’s
Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman (HJB) equation and the KF equation, plus the market clearing condi-
tions. The planner’s HJB equation is a PDE that determines the marginal social value of an agent
being in a certain state and the KF equation describes the distributional dynamics. This char-
acterization of the problem allows the comparison with the decentralized solution or competitive
equilibrium, in which each atomistic agent chooses her own controls without taking into account
their impact on the other agents. The competitive equilibrium is also composed by a system of
coupled PDEs: the individual HJB and the KF equation. The difference is that the planner’s HJB
equation includes a term reflecting the impact of individual policies on the aggregate distribution,
whereas the individual HJB does not. By comparing the two HJB equations we provide a condition
to verify whether the competitive allocation and the planned economy are equal.
1See Bertsekas (2005, 2012) or Fleming and Soner (2006) for an introduction to optimal control problems.
2This equation is also known as the Fokker-Planck equation.
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control problems with heterogeneous agents. Many continuous-time models with heterogeneous-
agents can be solved explicitly due to the particular set of assumptions that they make.3 In
contrast, Achdou et al. (2015) provide an efficient numerical strategy based on finite difference
methods in order to solve more general problems.4 Here we extend this methodology to the case of
optimal control. Our algorithm solves the planner’s HJB, the KF equation and finds the Lagrange
multipliers associated with the market clearing conditions.
The methodology presented here allows analyzing a variety of problems in economics. As
an application, we analyze the constrained efficient allocation in an incomplete-market economy
à la Aiyagari (1994) with stochastic-life agents. Recent research by Piketty and Saez (2003),
Atkinson, Piketty and Saez (2011) and others has documented how since the 1970s there has been
a progressive rise in top wealth inequality and in the stock of capital in several advanced economies,
which in cases such as the Unites States may be close to the historical maximum. This has led
to researchers such as Piketty (2014) or Atkinson (2015) to propose redistributive policies such
as wealth taxation as a way to reduce wealth inequality. Notwithstanding, the increase in wealth
inequality observed in the data is not necessarily negative from a social welfare perspective. It
depends on which is the “optimal” amount of capital in the economy and on its distribution: it is
not obvious that the society as a whole is better-off in a low-capital more equal situation compared
to a high-capital more unequal one, for example.
We apply the optimal control techniques discused above to try to shed light on this issue
by studying the optimal constrained-efficient wealth distribution in an Aiyagari economy with
stochastic-lifetimes as in the “perpetual youth” models of Yaari (1965) and Blanchard (1985). The
introduction of stochastic lifetimes generates a stationary wealth distribution with an upper tail
following a power law, a well-known empirical fact.5 The degree of wealth inequality, defined by
the right tail exponent, depends on the difference between the return on capital and the long-run
growth rate, (r − g) , as discussed by Piketty (2014).
The constrained efficient allocation is defined as the one in which a benevolent social planner
chooses the individual levels of consumption, while respecting all budget constraints. As discussed
by Diamond (1967) and Davila et al. (2012), this is a notion of efficiency that does not allow the
planner to directly overcome the friction implied by missing markets.6 This concept is related to
3Some examples are Jovanovic (1979), Luttmer (2007) or Alvarez and Shimer (2011). See Achdou et al. (2014)
for a recent survey of continuous-time models in macroeconomics.
4Also see Rocheteau et al (2015) who propose a related incomplete-markets framework and are able to obtain a
number of qualitative results.
5The emergence of a power-law in the wealth distribution has been analyzed in a number of previous papers, such
as Wold and Whittle (1957), Benhabib and Bisin (2007), Benhabib, Bisin and Zhu (2011, 2015a, 2015b), Piketty
and Zucman (2015), Jones (2015) or Acemoglu and Robinson (2015), among others. Here the power law is due to
the combination of random exponential lifetimes and a lower bound to the wealth distribution. A non-microfounded
approach to power laws using this mechanism is discussed in Gabaix et al. (2015).
6If the planner was able to fully redistribute across agents, the first-best allocation would be degenerated as a
The second contribution of the paper is to introduce a numerical algorithm to solve optimal
utilitarian planner would provide the same consumption level to every agent irrespective of her assets.
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that of a pecuniary externality. In the model agents do not internalize the effect of their individual
saving decisions on interest rates and wages. We show how the model is constrained inefficient: the
market economy is undercapitalized compared to the social optimum. The optimal allocation also
features more wealth inequality than the market economy as the reduction in interest rates due
to higher capital in the social optimum is not enough to compensate for the increase in aggregate
savings by wealthy households.
Related literature. Our paper relates to the recent discrete-time literature, such as Davila et
al. (2012) and Acikgoz (2014), analyzing problems in which a planner has to choose the controls
to be applied to a continuous population of heterogeneous agents. Davila et al. (2012) analyze
the constrained efficient allocation in an Aiyagari economy with infinite lifetimes using calculus
of variations. Acikgoz (2014) builds on this approach in order to solve the Ramsey problem in
a similar model. The continuous-time approach presented here differs from those papers in two
main aspects. The first is that we characterize the problem in terms of the planner HJB instead
of the Euler equation. More precisely, we show how the planner’s problem can be broken into
individual HJB equations in which the value function for each person is his marginal social value
under an optimal plan. The HJB equation for this marginal social value can then be compared
with the HJB equation in the competitive equilibrium, thereby obtaining an easily interpretable
formula that precisely characterizes the pecuniary externality causing the planner’s allocation to
differ from the equilibrium one. The second lies in the approach to compute the evolution of the
cross-sectional distribution. Traditional discrete-time methods either simulate a large number of
agents by Montecarlo methods or discretize the state-space. In contrast, in continuous time the
distributional dynamics are characterized by a partial differential equation: the KF equation. We
take advantage of this fact and develop an efficient and flexible computational algorithm using
finite-difference methods that applies to a wide class of planning problems in which a distribution
is the relevant state variable.
Our paper is also linked to a couple of recent papers that analyze optimal control problems
in continuous time.7 Lucas and Moll (2014) analyze an optimal planning problem subject to the
law of motion of the aggregate distribution. Their formulation nevertheless does not consider the
possibility of including aggregate constraints, such as market clearing conditions, which are preva-
lent in most economic problems. Here instead we analyze the general problem. This requires the
use of functional analysis, in particular of optimization techniques in infinite-dimensional Hilbert
spaces, in order to derive the necessary conditions for a solution. Another continuous-time paper
7In additon, it relates to the emerging literature in mathematics analyzing mean field control problems. The
name is borrowed from the mean-field approximation in statistical physics, in which the effect on any given individual
of all the other individuals is approximated by a single averaged effect. A survey may be found in Bensoussan,
Frehse and Yam (2013).
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that analyzes the optimal allocation with heterogeneous agents is Alfonso and Lagos (2015). They
assume that their state variables can only take a finite number of values, in contrast to a contin-
uum, and thus they can avoid the problem of optimization in infinite-dimensional spaces that we
analyze here. In many applications it is more natural to work with continuous state variables, for
example in models of wealth distribution like the one analyzed in the present paper.
The structure of the paper is as follows. In section 2 we discuss the problem of computing the
constrained-efficient allocation in an incomplete-markets economy with stochastic lifetimes as a
motivation. In section 3 we analyze the general case and present the main results. In section 4 we
introduce the numerical algorithm and apply it to solve the problem posed in section 2. Finally,
in section 5 we conclude.
2 The constrained-efficient allocation in an incomplete-
markets economy with stochastic lifetimes
We introduce here a model that extends the incomplete-markets economy à la Aiyagari (1994) with
stochastic-life agents as in the “perpetual youth” models of Yaari (1965) and Blanchard (1985).
Our aim is to analyze the optimal constrained efficient allocation in the sense of Davila et al.
(2012), as it is explained below.
2.1 Individuals
Let (Σ,F , {Ft} ,P) be a filtered probability space. There is a continuum of mass unity of agents
that are heterogeneous in their wealth A and labor productivity z. The duration of an agent’s
life is uncertain. Lifetimes τ are stochastic and governed by an exponential random variable with
mean 1/η. At the time of death each agent is replaced by a single child so that the size of the
population is constant.
Agents have standard preferences over utility flows from future consumption Ct discounted at
rate ρ ≥ 0 :
E0
" τ
0
e−ρtu(Ct)dt

= E0
" ∞
0
e−(ρ+η)tu(Ct)dt

, (1)
We assume CRRA preferences, such that u (C) = C
1−γ
1−γ . Individuals have no intergenerational
altruism and thus they purchase an annuity in a perfectly competitive insurance market that pays
them a flow ηAt in exchange of taking control of all the assets when the agent dies.8 Each agent
8The amount of resources collected from expired agents is ηKt, where Kt is the aggregate wealth, which equals
the flow of payments so that insurance companies make no profits.
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agent’s wealth evolves according to
dAt = (Wtzt + (rt + η)At − Ct) dt, (2)
where rt is the interest rate. Agents also face a borrowing limit,
At ≥ A¯ t, (3)
where A
¯ t
≤ 0. The agent’s labor productivity evolves stochastically over time on a bounded
interval [z
¯
, z¯] with z
¯
≥ 0, according to a bounded Ornstein—Uhlenbeck process:9
dzt = θ(zˆ − zt)dt+ σdBt,
where Bt is a Ft−adapted idiosyncratic Brownian motion and θ, zˆ and σ are positive constants.
We impose an additional restriction so that the “natural borrowing limit” is not binding:
A
¯ t
> −z
¯
" ∞
t
e−
? s
t rτdτWsds, ∀t ≥ 0.
The optimal value function results in
V (t, A, z) = max
{Cs}∞s=t
Et
" ∞
t
e−(ρ+η)(s−t)u(Cs)ds

, (4)
subject to evolution of individual wealth (2).
2.2 Firms
There is a representative firm with a constant returns to scale production function Y = F (K,L) =
Kα (ZL)1−α, where K is the aggregate capital, L is aggregate labor and Z is TFP. The lattest
evolves deterministically according to
Zt = e
gt,
where g is the constant long-run growth rate of the economy. Capital depreciates at rate δK . Since
factor markets are competitive, the interest rate and wage are given by
rt =
∂F (Kt, 1)
∂K
− δK = α
Yt
Kt
− δK , (5)
Wt =
∂F (Kt, 1)
∂L
= (1− α) Yt
Lt
.
9This is the continuous-time counterpart of the AR(1).
supplies zt efficiency units of labor to the labor market and these get valued at wage Wt. An
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2.3 Competitive equilibrium
As described above, agents leave no bequest. New agents begin with an initial debt A
¯ t
as we
assume that they had to borrow in order to finance their education.10 They are also born with
a labor productivity level of z
¯
. The state of the economy is the joint distribution of wealth and
labor, f(t, A, z). The dynamics of the distribution are given by the Kolmogorov Forward (KF)
equation
∂f(t, A, z)
∂t
= − ∂
∂A
[(wz + (r + η)A− C(t, A, z)) f(t, A, z)] (6)
− ∂
∂z
[θ(zˆ − z)f(t, A, z)] + 1
2
∂2
∂z2

σ2f

− ηf(t, A, z) + ηδ0,
∀A >A
¯ t
. The term −ηf(t, A, z) is the outflow of agents due to death and the term ηδ0 =
ηδ (A−A
¯ t
) δ (z − z
¯
) is the inflow of newborn agents with wealth A
¯ t
and productivity z
¯
.11 The
distribution should satisfy the normalization
" ∞
A
¯ t
" z¯
z
¯
f(t, A, z)dAdz = 1.
The total amount of capital supplied in the economy equals the total amount of wealth
Kt =
" ∞
A
¯ t
" z¯
z
¯
Af(t, A, z)dAdz, (7)
and the total amount of labor supplied in the economy equals one, L = 1.
We define a competitive equilibrium in this economy.
Definition 1 (Competitive equilibrium) A competitive equilibrium is composed by a pair of
factor pricesW (t), r(t), an aggregate capital stock K(t), a value function V (t, A, z), a consumption
policy C(t, A, z) and a distribution f(t, A, z) such that
10We could have assumed as well that newborns have zero initial assets. It would make no qualitative difference
and only a minor quantitative difference for the numerical results presented below.
11δ (·) is the Dirac delta, not to confound with the depreciation rate. The Dirac delta is a distribution or
generalized function such that
δ [f ] =
" ε
−ε
f(x)δ (x) dx = f(0), ∀ε > 0, f ∈ L1 (−ε, ε) .
A heuristic characterization is that
" ∞
∞
δ (x) dx = 1, δ (x) =

∞, x = 0,
0, x = 0.
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1. Given W, r and f , V is the solution of the individual’s problem (4) and the optimal control
is C.
2. Given K, firms maximize their profits and prices are given by (5).
3. Given W, r and C, f is the solution of the KF equation (6).
4. Given f and K, the capital market (7) clears.
2.4 Stationary distribution
Let’s analyze the ergodic case in which the aggregate distribution is time-independent. In this
case, non-stationary variables such as capital, wages, wealth or consumption grow at a rate g.12
We detrend them by dividing by egt. Let ct ≡ Cte−gt, preferences can be expressed as
E0
" ∞
0
e−[(ρ+η)−(1−γ)g]t
c1−γt
1− γ dt

,
and the evolution of individual detrended wealth at ≡ Ate−gt follows
dat = [wzt + (r − g + η) at − Ct] dt,
where w ≡ Wte−gt is the constant detrended wage. Notice the term (r − g) in the drift of the
wealth, as underlined by Piketty (2014). We assume that the borrowing constraint is of the form
A
¯ t
= −φegt, (8)
with 0 ≤ φ ≤z
¯
w
r
.
The Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman (HJB) equation of the individual problem is
[(ρ+ η)− (1− γ) g]V (a, z) = max
c
c1−γ
1− γ + [wz + (r − g + η) a− c (t, a, z)]
∂V
∂a
(9)
+θ(zˆ − z)∂V
∂z
+
σ2
2
∂2V
∂z2
.
And the KF equation
0 = − ∂
∂a
[(wz + (r − g + η) a− c(a, z)) f(a, z)] (10)
− ∂
∂z
[θ(zˆ − z)f(a, z)] + 1
2
∂2
∂z2

σ2f(a, z)

− ηf(a, z) + ηδ0,
where δ0 = δ (a+ φ) δ (z − z¯) .
12Non-stationary variables were previously defined with capital letters.
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Factor prices are given by
r = αkα−1 − δK , w = (1− α) kα, (11)
where k ≡ Kte−gt is the constant detrended capital.
Finally, the market clearing condition results in
k =
" ∞
-φ
" z¯
z
¯
af(a, z)dadz. (12)
The proposition below shows how the Aiyagari model with exogenous deaths features a fat-tail
ergodic wealth distribution.
Proposition 1 Provided that ρ + γη > (1− γ) r and r > r∗ ≡ ρ + γg, the stationary wealth
distribution is characterized by an asymptotic power law, f(a) ∼ a−(1+ζ), with tail exponent
ζ =
ηγ
r − r∗ =
ηγ
(r − g)− (ρ− (1− γ) g) . (13)
Proof. See Appendix A.
The insight that the combination of a Blanchard-Yaari setting with an optimal consumption
problem produces a power-law distribution is due to Benhabib and Bisin (2007). Our result differs
from theirs in three regards. First, we analyze a stochastic general equilibrium incomplete-market
case whereas Benhabib and Bisin work in a complete-market deterministic environment (except
for the death probability) where interest rates and wages are exogenous. Second, we assume
that agents only care about their own utility and hence we do not consider any “joy of giving”
preferences for bequests. Finally, we work with general CRRA utility instead of the particular case
of log-utility.
2.5 Constrained efficiency
We investigate the optimal allocation of wealth in this economy. Due to heterogeneity, our op-
timality criterion requires some degree of interpersonal utility comparison. In line with most of
the literature, we consider a utilitarian social welfare function (SWF) so that the objective of
the social planner is ex-ante expected utility. This amounts to a probability-weighted average:
the planner is “behind the veil of ignorance.” In addition, it is necessary to specify which degree
of redistribution is possible for the planner. If the planner was able to fully redistribute across
agents, the first-best allocation would be degenerated as a utilitarian planner would provide the
same consumption level to every agent irrespective of his or her assets. This allocation does not
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seem too interesting as a practical benchmark. Instead, we follow Davila et al. (2012) and focus on
the study of the constrained-efficient allocation. In this case the planner is constrained to consider
allocations with zero net transfers across individuals. The question is whether the planner can
improve on the market allocation by simply commanding different levels of consumption, while
respecting all individual budget constraints. This issue is closely related to the existence of a
pecuniary externality, typically present in this kind of models: individual agents do not internalize
that their saving decisions affect the aggregate amount of capital, which affects the rest of agents
through wages and interest rates. The planner does take this effect into account when computing
the optimal individual saving decision and thus the optimal wealth allocation.
The problem of the planner is to choose individual consumption c (t, ·) across agents in order
to maximize the discounted aggregate utility
J (f (0, ·)) = max
{c(t,·)}∞t=0
" ∞
0
e−ρt
" ∞
-φ
" z¯
z
¯
u (c) f (t, a, z) dzda

dt, (14)
= max
{c(t,·)}∞t=0
" ∞
0
" ∞
-φ
" z¯
z
¯
e−[ρ−(1−γ)g]t
(c (t, a, z))1−γ
1− γ f (t, a, z) dzdadt,
subject to the law of motion of the aggregate distribution (10), to the factor prices (11) and to
the market clearing condition (12). Here J (f (0, ·)) is the optimal value functional, as its state
variable is a distribution f (0, ·) .
Notice that the planner gives the same weight to every agent irrespective of its age. This
contrasts with the SWF chosen in Benhabib and Bisin (2007) which only considers the welfare of
the agents alive at an arbitrary time. Notice also that the planner discounts future aggregate utility
flows at the same rate of individual agents ρ, not at rate (ρ+ η) . The theoretical and numerical
approach to solve problem (14) will be described in the next two sections.
3 General approach
In this section we analyze a general optimal control problem with heterogeneous agents and provide
the necessary conditions for a solution.
3.1 Competitive equilibrium
3.1.1 Individual problem.
We consider a continuous-time infinite-horizon economy. Let (Σ,F , {Ft} ,P) be a filtered probabil-
ity space. There is a continuum of unit mass of ex-ante identical agents indexed by j ∈ [0, 1] . The
duration of an agent’s life is uncertain. Death is governed by a Poisson random variable with rate
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η. At the time of death each agent is replaced by a single child so that the size of the population
is constant.
Let Bjt be a n-dimensional Ft-adapted Brownian motion and Xjt ∈ Ω denote the state of an
agent j at time t ∈ [0,∞). The state evolves according to a multidimensional Itô process of the
form
dXjt = b

Xjt ,μ(t,X
j
t ), Zt

dt+ σ

Xjt

dBjt , (15)
where Xjt is a reflected process bounded in the domain Ω ⊂ Rn, μ ∈ Rm is am−dimensional vector
of policy variables and Zt ∈ Rp is a deterministic p-dimensional vector of aggregate variables. Here
the instantaneous drift b (·) and volatility σ (·) are measurable functions, b ∈ C1(Ω×Rm×Rp) and
σ ∈ C2(Ω).13 In the Appendix B we provide some technical assumptions to ensure the existence
of a solution of the stochastic differential equation (15).
The policy vector μ is an Ft- adapted Markov control. The control μ(t, x) is admissible if for
any initial point (t, x) such that Xjt = x the stochastic differential equation (15) has a unique
solution.14 We denoteM as the space of all admissible controls contained in the set of all Markov
controls. The control strategy is the same for every agent, but it depends on time and on the
specific state of the agent.
Agents maximize their discounted utility. The optimal value function V (t, x) is defined as
V (t, x) = max
μ∈M
Et
" ∞
t
e−(ρ+η)(s−t)u(X(t),μ)ds|Xt = x

, (16)
subject to (15),15 where utility u(x,μ) ∈ C1(Ω × Rm) is strictly increasing and strictly concave
and ρ > 0 is a constant. The transversality condition is
lim
t↑∞
e−ρtV (t, x) = 0. (17)
The solution to this problem is given by a value function V (t, x) and a control strategy μ(t, x)
that satisfy the HJB equation
ρV (t, x) =
∂V
∂t
+max
μ∈M
{u(x,μ) +AV } , (18)
13Ck(Ω) is the set of all k-times continuously differentiable functions on Ω.
14This is guaranteed if E
# t
0
		μ(s,Xis)
		j ds
$
<∞, ∀t <∞, for j ∈ N.
15We have dropped the superindex j as there is no possibility of confusion.
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where A is the infinitesimal generator of process (15):
AV =
n!
i=1
bi (x,μ, Z)
∂V
∂xi
+
n!
i=1
n!
k=1

σ(x)σ(x)

i,k
2
∂2V
∂xi∂xk
− ηV (t, x) . (19)
The infinitesimal generator of a stochastic process is a partial differential operator that encodes the
main information about the process. It is typically defined as Af (x) = limt↓0 E0[f(Xt)|X0=x]−f(x)t .16
3.1.2 Aggregate distribution and aggregate variables.
Assume that the transition measure ofXt with initial value x˜0 has a density f(t, x; x˜0) ∈ C2([0,∞)×
Ω), i.e., that ∀ϕ ∈ C2(Ω) :
E0 [ϕ(Xt)|X0 = x˜0] =
"
Ω
ϕ(x)f(t, x; x˜0)dx.
The initial distribution of Xt at time t = 0 is f(0, x) = f0(x).We assume than the new cohorts
of agents are born with an initial state x0. The dynamics of the distribution of agents f(t, x) are
given by the Kolmogorov Forward (KF) equation
∂f
∂t
= A∗f + ηδx0 , (20)
"
Ω
f(t, x)dx = 1, (21)
where A∗ is the adjoint operator of A :
A∗f = −
n!
i=1
∂
∂xi
[bi (x,μ, Z) f (t, x)] +
1
2
n!
i=1
n!
k=1
∂2
∂xi∂xk
#
σ(x)σ(x)

i,k
f (t, x)
$
− ηf (t, x) ,
and δx0 = δ (x− x0) is the Dirac delta centered at x0.17
The vector of aggregate variables is determined by a system of p equations:
Zk(t) =
"
Ω
gk(x,μ)f(t, x)dx, k = 1, .., p. (22)
where gk ∈ C1 (Ω× Rm). These equations are typically the market clearing conditions.
We may define a competitive equilibrium in this economy.
Definition 2 (Competitive equilibrium) A competitive equilibrium is a vector of aggregate
variables Zt, a value function V (t, x), a control μ(t, x) and a distribution f(t, x) such that
16See, for example, Øksendal (2010).
17The adjoint operator generalizes the concept of matrix transpose for infinite-dimensional operators.
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1. Given Zt and f(t, x), V (t, x) is the solution of the HJB equation (18) and the optimal control
is μ(t, x).
2. Given μ(t, x) and Zt, f(t, x) is the solution of the KF equation (20, 21).
3. Given μ(t, x) and f(t, x), the aggregate variables Zt satisfy the market clearing conditions
(22).
Example 1 In the notation of this section, the example of section 2 can be expressed as
Ω = (a
¯
,∞)× (z
¯
, z¯) ⊂ R2,
x =

a
z

,
b (x,μ, Z) =

(1− α) kαz + [(αkα−1 − δK)− g + η] a− c
θ(zˆ − z)

,
σ (x) =

0 0
0 σz

,
g(x,μ) = a,
u(x,μ) =
c1−γ
1− γ + κξφ (a) ,
Z = k,
μ(t, x) = c(a, z),
where a
¯
< -φ and κξφ (a) ∈ C1 (a¯ ,∞) is a penalty function that equals zero if a ≥ −φ and approx-
imates κ if a < −φ. We let 0 < κ < ∞ be large enough so that κξφ approximates the borrowing
constraint (3, 8).
3.2 Planner’s problem
3.2.1 Statement
We now study the allocation of a planner who chooses a vector of control variables μ(t, x) to be
applied to every agent j ∈ [0, 1] with state dynamics (15). The planner also chooses the vector
of aggregate variables Zt given the constraints (22). The planner chooses the controls and the
aggregate variables in order to maximize the discounted aggregate utility
J (f (0, ·)) ≡ max
Z(·), μ∈M
" ∞
0
"
Ω
e−ρtω(t, x)u(x,μ)f(t, x)dxdt, (23)
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subject to law of motion of the distribution (20, 21) and to the market clearing conditions (22).
Notice the inclusion of the state-dependent Pareto weights ω(t, x). If ω(t, x) = 1 then we have
a purely utilitarian social welfare function. Notice also that the planner discounts future utility
flows at rate ρ, not at rate (ρ+ η) .
Notice that J is the optimal value functional as it maps from the space of initial densities
f (0, ·) into the real numbers. The planner’s problem with heterogeneous agents is an extension
of the classical optimal control problem to an infinite dimensional setting, in which the state is
the whole distribution of individual states f(t, x). The problem is deterministic, as so is the KF
equation.
3.2.2 Solution
We provide necessary conditions to the problem (23).
Proposition 2 (Necessary conditions) If a solution to problem (23) exists, the optimal value
functional J (f (0, ·)) can be expressed as
J (f (0, ·)) =
"
Ω
j(0, x)f(0, x)dx, (24)
where j (t, x) is the marginal social value function, which represents the social value of an agent at
time t with an state x. The social value function satisfies the HJB
ρj(t, x) =
∂j
∂t
+max
μ∈M

ω(t, x)u(x,μ) +
p!
k=1
λk(t) [gk(x,μ)− Zk] +Aj

+ ηjδx0 , (25)
where the Lagrange multipliers λk(t), k = 1, .., p are given by
λk(t) = −
"
Ω
j(t, x)

n!
i=1

∂2bi
∂Zk∂xi
f(t, x) +
m!
j=1
∂2bi
∂Zk∂μj
∂μj
∂xi
f(t, x) +
∂bi
∂Zk
∂f
∂xi

dx. (26)
The proof can be found in the Appendix C. This proposition is the central result of the paper.
It provides a system of partial differential equations consisting of the HJB (25), the KF (20, 21)
and the market clearing conditions (22) which link the dynamics of the social value function j,
the policies μ, the aggregate variables Z and the distribution f.18 The Lagrance multipliers in
(26) reflect the ‘shadow prices’ of the market clearing condition. They price, in utility terms, the
deviation of an agent from the value of the aggregate variable: gk(x,μ)− Zk.
18We have implicitly assumed that j ∈ C2 (Ω) . We do not provide any theoretical result if this is not the case
although our numerical procedure is able to accommodate viscosity solutions, as described below.
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Notice that the necessary conditions in the planner’s problem with ω = 1 are the same as those
in the competitive equilibrium, with the exception of the term
p
k=1 λk [gk(x,μ)− Zk] + ηjδx0 in
the planner’s HJB equation (25). Therefore, it is trivial to check the following corollary.
Corollary 1 (Constrained optimality of the competitive equilibrium) The competitive equi-
librium equals the social optimum in the utilitarian sense (ω = 1) if
p!
k=1
λ˜k(t) (gk(x,μ)− Zk) + ηV (t, x) δx0 = 0, (27)
where λ˜k(t) are given by
λ˜k(t) = −
"
Ω
V (t, x)

n!
i=1

∂2bi
∂Zk∂xi
f(t, x) +
m!
j=1
∂2bi
∂Zk∂μj
∂μj
∂xi
f +
∂bi
∂Zk
∂f
∂xi

dx. (28)
Notice that we have replaced j(t, x) by V (t, x) in (28), that is, the marginal social value equals
the individual value. Therefore, it is enough to solve the competitive equilibrium and to compute
(27) to check whether it is socially optimal.
Example 2 In the example of section 2, the HJB equation in the constrained efficient solution is
[(ρ+ η)− (1− γ) g] j (a, z) = max
c
c1−γ
1− γ + λ (a−K) + [wz + (r − g + η) a− c]
∂j
∂a
(29)
+θ(zˆ − z)∂j
∂z
+
σ2
2
∂2j
∂z2
+ ηjδ (a+ φ) δ (z − z
¯
) ,
with the Lagrange multiplier
λ =
α (1− α)
k2−α
"
Ω
j(a, z)

f(a, z) + a
∂f
∂a
− kz∂f
∂a

dadz. (30)
Notice that equation (29) equals the individual HJB (9) plus λ (a−K)+ ηjδ (a+ φ) δ (z − z
¯
) . The
term λ (a−K) reflects the correction in the social value j compared to the individual value V due
to the difference between the agent’s wealth a and the average K. If the Lagrange multiplier λ is
positive, then the social value of wealthy agents is higher than their private value and hence there
is capital underaccumulation. If λ is negative, then the private value is higher than the social one
and there is capital overaccumulation.
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4 Computational algorithm
In this section we provide a numerical algorithm to solve the planning problem. First we provide
a general description and then we solve the example.
4.1 General algorithm
The general idea for the solution of infinite-horizon coupled HJB-KF systems is to first solve the
steady-state and then iterate backward and forward in time, as described in Achdou et al. (2015).
The approach here is similar, taking into account that the problem is more complicated as we also
need to find the value of the time-varying Lagrange multipliers.
4.1.1 Steady-state
The steady-state can be computed using a relaxation algorithm. Given a constant θ ∈ (0, 1),
begin with an initial guess of the aggregate variables Z0 and the Lagrange multipliers λ0 = 0, set
n,m = 0:
1. Given Zn and λm, solve the HJB equation (25) in the stationary case (∂j
∂t
= 0) and obtain
the social value function jn and the optimal policies μn.
2. Given the optimal policies μn solve the KF equation (20) in the stationary case (∂f
∂t
= 0) and
obtain the distribution fn.19
3. Given the optimal policies μn and the distribution fn, compute the aggregate variables Z˜n+1
using the market clearing conditions (22). If Z˜n+1 = Zn, set Zn+1 = θZ˜n+1 + (1− θ)Zn,
update n := n+ 1 and return to step 1.
4. Compute λ˜
m+1
using the definition (26). If λ˜
n+1 = λn, set λn+1 = θλ˜n+1+(1− θ)λn, update
m := m+ 1 and return to step 1.
If the algorithm converges, it should produce the steady-state value function j∞, the optimal
policies μ∞, the aggregate variables Z∞, the Lagrange multipliers λ∞ and the distribution f∞.
20
19Achdou et al. (2015) show how the solution of the stationary KF equation just reduces to the inversion of the
matrix characterizing the infinitesimal generator of the stochastic process. This is a sparse matrix, which can be
inverted using standar numerical techniques.
20We do not provide any proof of convergence of our numerical algorithm.
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4.1.2 Dynamics
In order to solve the dynamics, we guess a time T long enough for the system to converge to
the steady-state and then we iterate backward and forthward, taking as given two objects: the
steady-state value function j∞ and the initial distribution f0. We begin with an initial path for
aggregate variables Z0t = Z∞, t ∈ [0, T ] and the Lagrange multipliers λ0t = λ∞. Set n,m = 0 :
1. Given Zn (t) and λm (t) , solve the HJB equation (25) backward beginning at jT = j∞ and
obtain the social value function jnt and the optimal policies μ
n
t .
2. Given the optimal policies μnt solve the KF equation (20) forward beginning at f0 and obtain
the distribution fnt .
3. Given the optimal policies μnt and the distribution f
n
t , compute the aggregate variables
Z˜n+1t using the market clearing conditions (22). If ∃t ∈ [0, T ] such that Z˜n+1t = Znt , set
Zn+1t = θZ˜
n+1
t + (1− θ)Znt , update n := n+ 1 and return to step 1.
4. Compute λ˜
m+1
t using the definition (26). If ∃t ∈ [0, T ] such that λ˜
n+1
t = λnt , set λn+1t =
θλ˜
n+1
t + (1− θ)λnt , update m := m+ 1 and return to step 1.
If the algorithm converges, it should produce the complete dynamics of the system.
4.2 The optimal wealth distribution with incomplete markets and sto-
chastic lifetimes
We solve numerically the stationary problem of section 2 using the steady-state algorithm described
above. In order to solve the HJB and the KF equations, we employ a finite difference method
described in Appendix D. As discussed in Achdou et al. (2015), the appropriate solution concept
of HJB equation with state constraints is that of a “viscosity solution” (Crandall and Lions, 1983;
Crandall, Ishii and Lions, 1992) and the proposed finite difference method converges to the unique
viscosity solution of this problem (Barles and Souganidis, 1991). The idea of the finite difference
method is to approximate the value function V (a, z) and the distribution f(a, z) on a finite grid
with steps Δa and Δz and to compute derivatives as differences.
4.2.1 Calibration
Let the unit of time be one year, such that all rates are in annual terms. We assume a long-run
growth rate of output, g, of 1 per cent roughly close to the long-run per capita GDP growth in the
US economy. We also assume a death rate, η, of 2 percent, equivalent to an average lifetime of 50
years. The capital share parameter, α, is taken to be 0.36 and the depreciation rate of capital, δK ,
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is 0.10. The borrowing constraint, φ, in our paper is set to 5. This value is chosen such that the
right-tail exponent of the distribution ζ, is roughly 1.5, a similar value to that in the United States
according to Achdou et al. (2015). The mean of the income process, zˆ, is set to 1. The calibration
of the rest of parameters follows Aiyagari (1994) and Davila et al. (2012), taking into account that
in contrast to both papers we have stochastic lifetimes and long-run growth. The intertemporal
elasticity of substitution 1
γ
is set to 0.5 so that the risk aversion is 2. The income process is
calibrated to have an autocorrelation of 0.6 and a coefficient of variation, of 0.2, so that θ = 0.4
and σ = 0.2. The subjective discount rate, ρ, is set to 0.01 such that the stationary discount rate
ρˆ ≡ (ρ+ η) − (1− γ) g is set to 0.04, which is the equivalent concept to the discount rate in the
two papers. Finally, in order to solve numerically the model, we employ a grid with 500 points
in wealth, ranging from −5 to 200, and 20 points in income, from 0.5 to 1.5. We introduce an
upper bound to the wealth distribution of 200, equivalent to around 50 times the average wealth,
in order to capture most of the dynamics at the right tail of the distribution.21
4.2.2 Results
The first column in Table 1 displays the steady-state values for the main aggregate variables in the
competitive equilibrium. Capital is two and a half times larger than output and the interest rate, r,
is 4.45 per cent, a value larger than r∗ ≡ ρ+γg = 3% in Proposition 1. Notice also that the adjusted
interest rate (r − g + η) = 5.45% is larger than the adjusted discount rate ρˆ = 4%, but it poses
no problem as agents cannot accumulate wealth indefinitely due to their random deaths. Figure
1 displays the savings policy s(a, z) ≡ (wz + (r − g + η) a− c(a, z)) and the wealth-productivity
distribution f(a, z). Notice how, in the case of the distribution, there is a large proportion of the
agents at the borrowing limit of −φ = −5 for values of z below 1. By construction the model also
replicates the wealth inequality observed in the United States, with an exponent, ζ, around 1.5.22
21Result are robust to changes in the size of the domain.
22The exponent is computed numerically for wealth levels between the first and the last decile of the wealth
distribution. The wealth distribution is defined as
f(a) ≡
" z¯
z
¯
f(a, z)dz.
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Figure 1: Savings policy and wealth-productivity distribution in the competitive equilibrium.
Table 1. Model results
Competitive equilibrium Constrained optimum
Aggregate capital, k 4.16 4.87
Output, y 1.67 1.77
Capital-output ratio, k/y 2.49 2.75
Interest rate (%), r 4.45 3.07
Pareto exponent , ζ 1.53 0.77
In order to solve the planner’s problem we need to jointly solve the HJB equation (29), the KF
equation (10) and the definition of the Lagrange multiplier (30), as described in Appendix D. For
the calibration above, the value of λ results in 0.0044. The positiveness of λ implies that the social
value of individuals with large wealth is higher than their private value. The second column in
Table 1 displays the results in this case. The constrained-efficient allocation features larger levels
of output, capital and of the capital-output ratio than the competitive equilibrium. This means
that the market economy is undercapitalized compared to the social optimum, which necessarily
implies larger levels of savings and lower interest rates in the optimum. The social optimum also
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Figure 2: Savings policy and wealth-productivity distribution in the constrained-efficient alloca-
tion.
features a higher level of wealth inequality with a Pareto exponent of 0.77.23 Notice that despite
the fact that the slope is smaller than one, the wealth distribution has a well-defined mean as it is
bounded by a maximum a = 200.24
Figure 2 illustrates how, despite the lower interest rates, savings s(a, z) are higher in the
optimal allocation than in the market economy, which explains the lower value of the tail exponent
in that case. The bottom line of this analysis is that the reduction in interest rates in the social
optimum is not enough to compensate for the increase in aggregate savings by wealthy households,
thus resulting in an increase in wealth inequality. This is naturally linked to the fact that the
competitive allocation displays less capital than the constrained-efficient allocation, and therefore
a larger level of aggregate savings is welfare-improving.
Finally, we compare aggregate welfare in both allocations. Aggregate welfare in the stationary
case can be defined as
U =
1
ρˆ
" ∞
-φ
" z¯
z
¯
u (c) f (t, a, z) dadz. (31)
23The planning economy also displays a power-law distribution, but with a smaller slope than the competitive
equilibrium.
24This also explains why the interest rate may be larger than g = 1%.
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of all agents such that the welfare in both allocations (constrained and competitive) is the same
" ∞
-φ
" z¯
z
¯
uconst (c (1 +Θ)) f const (t, a, z) dadz =
" ∞
-φ
" z¯
z
¯
ucomp (c) f comp (t, a, z) dadz,
and hence
Θ =

U const
U comp
 1
1−γ
− 1 = 0.088, (32)
that is, there is an average 8.8 percent gain in consumption-equivalent terms in the optimal allo-
cation compared to the market one.
5 Conclusions
This paper analyzes the problem of a planner who controls a population of heterogeneous agents
subject to idiosyncratic shocks in order to maximize an optimality criterion related to the distri-
bution of states across agents. If the problem is analyzed in continuous time, the KF equation
provides a deterministic law of motion of the entire distribution of state variables across agents.
The problem can thus be analyzed as one of deterministic optimal control in which both the con-
trol and the state are distributions. If a solution exists, we show how it should satisfy a system of
coupled PDEs composed by the planner’s HJB and the KF equations. We also introduce a simple
criterion to check whether a competitive equilibrium is constrained efficient.
We provide a numerical algorithm in order to find the solution to the planning problem. As an
application, we employ this algorithm to analyze the welfare properties of an Aiyagari economy
with stochastic lifetimes. In particular, we analyze the constrained social optimum in which a
social planner maximizes the aggregate welfare subject to the same equilibrium budget constraints
and competitive price setting as the individual agents. We show how the social optimum features
more capital than the market economy. We also show how the level of wealth inequality is higher
in the social optimum as the reduction in interest rates due to higher capital is not enough to
compensate for the increase in aggregate savings by wealthy households.
In order to compare both allocations, we express the ratio of welfare in consumption equivalent
terms, that is, we express it as the proportion Θ of increase in the stationary consumption c(a, z)
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Appendix
A. Proof of Proposition 1
The proof mimics the reasoning in the proof of Proposition 6 in Achdou et al. (2015). First we
show that individual consumption is asymptotically linear in a (as a→ ∞) and given by
c ∼ ρ+ γη − (1− γ) r
γ
a, (33)
which has a positive solution as long as ρ + γη − (1− γ) r > 0. This policy is the solution of
the auxiliary problem without labor income, wz, and without borrowing constraint (φ = ∞),
characterized by the HJB equation
[(ρ+ η)− (1− γ) g]V (a) = max
c
c1−γ
1− γ + [(r − g + η) a− c (t, a, z)]V
	 (a) , (34)
where V (a) =


ρ+γη−(1−γ)r
γ
−γ
a1−γ
1−γ + κ and κ is a constant.
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Second, given the HJB equation (25), for any ξ > 0, V (a, z) = ξ1−γVξ(a/ξ, z), where Vξ(a, z)
solves
[(ρ+ η)− (1− γ) g]Vξ(a, z) = max
c
c1−γ
1− γ + [wz/ξ + (r − g + η) a− c (t, a, z)]
∂Vξ(a, z)
∂a
+θ(zˆ − z)∂Vξ(a, z)
∂z
+
σ2
2
∂2Vξ(a, z)
∂z2
, a ≥ −φ/ξ.
This can be easily verified as V (a, z) = ξ1−γVξ(a/ξ, z),
∂V (a,z)
∂a
= ξ−γ ∂Vξ(a/ξ,z)
∂(a/ξ)
, ∂V (a,z)
∂z
= ξ1−γ ∂Vξ(a/ξ,z)
∂z
,
∂2Vξ(a,z)
∂z2
= ξ1−γ ∂
2Vξ(a,z)
∂z2
.
Third, notice how in the asymptotic limit limξ→∞ Vξ(a, z) = V (a) and limξ→∞ cξ(a, z) = c (a) ,
the latter given by equation (33). This is equivalent so state that for large a, we have c(a, z) ≈
ρ+γη−(1−γ)r
γ
a.
The stationary KF equation for large a then results in
0 = − d
da

r − g + η − ρ+ γη − (1− γ) r
γ

af (a)

− ηf (a) .
We may guess and verify that f (a) ∼ a−(1+ζ) and then we get
ζ

r − (ρ+ γg)
γ

= η.
B. Technical assumptions
These assumptions are adapted from Bensoussan, Chan and Yam (2015). Let P2 (Ω) be the space
of probability measures equipped with the 2nd Wasserstein metric, W2 (·, ·) such that for any
υ1,υ2 ∈ P2 (Ω) ,
W2 (υ1, υ2) = inf
γ∈Γ(υ1,υ2)
"
Ω×Ω
|x− y|2 dγ (x, y)
 1
2
,
where the infimum is taken over the family Γ (υ1, υ2) of all joint measures with respective marginals
υ1 and υ2. Let m ∈ P2 (Ω) be such that dm = fdx where f ∈ L2 (Ω) is a density function given
by (20) and dx is the Lebesgue measure in Ω.We can combine the definition of the drift b (x,μ, Z)
in (15) with the definition of the aggregate variable Z in (22) and the definition of measure m to
represent the drift as b (x,μ,m) . We write M2 (m) =
 
Ω |x|2 dm (x)
 1
2 .
BANCO DE ESPAÑA 31 DOCUMENTO DE TRABAJO N.º 1533
1. Lipschitz continuity. There exists K > 0, such that
|b (x,μ,m)− b (x	,μ	,m	)| ≤ K (|x− x	|+W2 (m,m	) + |μ− μ	|) ,
|σ (x)− σ (x	)| ≤ K (|x− x	|) .
2. Linear growth. There exists K > 0, such that
|b (x,μ,m)| ≤ K (1 + |x|+M2 (m) + |μ|) ,
|σ (x)| ≤ K (1 + |x|) .
3. Quadratic condition on the objective. There exists K > 0, such that
e−ρtω(t, x)u (x,μ)m− e−ρtω(t	, x	)u (x	,μ	)m	
 ≤ K

1 + |t|+ |t	|+ |x|+ |x	|
+M2 (m) +M2 (m
	) + |μ|+ |μ	|

·

|t− t	|+ |x− x	|
+W2 (m,m
	) + |μ− μ	|

.
C. Proof of Proposition 2.
The idea of the proof is to solve problem (23) using differentiation techniques in infinite-dimensional
Hilbert spaces.
C.1. Mathematic preliminaries
First we need to introduce some mathematical concepts.25 Let L2 (Φ) be the space of functions
with a square that is Lebesgue-integrable over Φ ⊂ Rn. It is a Banach space with the norm
fL2(Φ) =
&"
Φ
|f(x)|2 dx,
that is, it is a complete normed vector space. In contrast to n-dimensional Banach spaces such as
Rn, L2 (Φ) is infinite-dimensional.
The space of Lebesgue-integrable functions L2 (Φ) with the inner product
u, fΦ =
"
Φ
ufdx, ∀u, f ∈ L2 (Φ) ,
The assumptions are
25All the contents here are adapted from texts such as Luenberger (1969), Brezis (2011), Gelfand and Fomin
(1991) or Sagan (1992).
is a Hilbert space.
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An operator T is a mapping from one vector space to another. For example, given the process
Xt described in (15), its infinitesimal generator A is an operator in L2 (Φ) defined by (19). The
adjoint operator T ∗ of a linear operator T in a Hilbert space is defined by the equation
u, TfΦ = T ∗u, fΦ .
Let J (f) : L2 (Φ) → R be a linear functional of f. A functional is bounded (or continuous) if
there is a constant M such that
J ≡ sup
f =0
|J (f)|
fL2(Φ)
≤M.
The Riesz representation theorem allows us to express functionals as inner products.
Theorem 2 (Riesz representation theorem) Let J (f) be a linear continuous functional in
L2 (Φ). Then there exists a unique function j ∈ L2 (Φ) such that
J(f) = j, fΦ =
"
Φ
j(x)f(x)dx.
Proof. See Brezis (2011, pp. 97-98).
There are two concepts of differentials in Hilbert spaces.
Definition 3 (Gateaux differential) Let J (f) be a linear continuous functional and let h be
arbitrary in L2 (Φ) . If the limit
δJ (f ;h) = lim
α→0
J (f + αh)− J (f)
α
(35)
exists, it is called the Gateaux differential of J at f with increment h. If the limit (35) exists for
each h ∈ L2 (Φ) , the functional J is said to be Gateaux differentiable at f.
If the limit exists, it can be expressed as δJ (f ;h) = d
dα
J (f + αh) |α=0. A more restricted
concept is that of the Fréchet differential.
Definition 4 (Fréchet differential) Let h be arbitrary in L2 (Φ) . If for fixed f ∈ L2 (Φ) there
exists δJ (f ;h) which is linear and continuous with respect to h such that
lim
hL2(Φ)→0
|J (f + h)− J (f)− δJ (f ;h)|
hL2(Φ)
= 0,
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then J is said to be Fréchet differentiable at f and δJ (f ;h) is the Fréchet differential of J at f
with increment h.
The following proposition links both concepts.
Proposition 3 If the Fréchet differential of J exists at f , then the Gateaux differential exists at
f and they are equal.
Proof. See Luenberger (1969, p. 173).
The familiar technique of maximizing a function of a single variable by ordinary calculus can be
extended in infinite dimensional spaces to a similar technique based on more general differentials.
We use the term extremum to refer to a maximum or a minimum over any set. A a function
f ∈ L2 (Φ) is a maximum of J(f) if for all functions h, h− fL2(Φ) < ε then J(f) ≥ J(h). The
following theorem is the Fundamental Theorem of Calculus.
Theorem 3 Let J have a Gateaux differential, a necessary condition for J to have an extremum
at f is that δJ (f ;h) = 0 for all h ∈ L2 (Φ) .
Proof. Luenberger (1969, p. 173), Gelfand and Fomin (1991, pp. 13-14) or Sagan (1992, p. 34).
Finally, we can extend this result to the case of constrained optimization.
Theorem 4 (Lagrange multipliers) Let H be a mapping from L2 (Φ) into Rn. If J has a con-
tinuous Fréchet differential, a necessary condition for J to have an extremum at f under the
constraint H(f) = 0 at the function f is that there exists a function λ ∈ L2 (Φ) such that the
Lagrangian functional
L(f) = J(f) + λ, H(f)Φ (36)
is stationary in f, i.e., δL (f ;h) = 0.
Proof. Luenberger (1969, p. 243).
C.2. Proof of the proposition
Let’s define the extended domain Φ ≡ [0,∞)× Ω The problem of the planner is to maximize
"
Φ
e−ρtω (t, x) u(x,μ)f (t, x) dtdx =

e−ρtωu

, f

Φ ,
subject to the KF equation (20)
−∂f
∂t
+A∗f + ηδx0 = 0, ∀ (t, x) ∈ Φ
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and the market clearing condition (22)
"
Ω
[gk(x,μ)− Zk(t)] f(t, x)dx, k = 1, .., p, ∀t ∈ [0,∞). (37)
Assuming that the conditions above are satisfied, we can express the Lagrangian functional
(36) for this problem as
L = e−ρtωu , fΦ +

e−ρtj,

−∂f
∂t
+A∗f + ηδx0

Φ
(38)
+
p!
k=1

e−ρtλk, (gk − Zk) f

Φ ,
where j = j(t, x) ∈ L2 (Φ) and λk = λk(t) ∈ L2(0,∞), k = 1, .., p are the Lagrange multipliers.
A necessary condition for [f,μ1, ..,μm, Z1, .., Zp] to be a maximum of (38) is that the Gateaux
derivative with respect to each of these functions equals zero.
It will prove useful to modify the second term in the Lagrangian

e−ρtj,

−∂f
∂t
+A∗f + ηδx0

Φ
=
" ∞
0
"
Ω
e−ρtj (t, x)

−∂f
∂t
+A∗f + ηδx0

dtdx (39)
=
"
Ω
e−ρtj (t, x) f (t, x)
∞
0
dx+
" ∞
0
"
Ω
e−ρt

∂j
∂t
− ρj (t, x)

fdtdx
+η
" ∞
0
e−ρtj (t, x0) f (t, x0) dt+

e−ρtAj, fΦ
= −
"
Ω
j (0, x) f (0, x) dx+ η
" ∞
0
e−ρtj (t, x0) f (t, x0) dt
+

e−ρt

∂j
∂t
− ρj +Aj

, f

Φ
,
where we have integrated by parts with respect to time in the term ∂f
∂t
and applied the fact that
A∗ is the adjoint operator of A. The term  
Ω
j (0, x) f (0, x) dx can be ignored as f (0, x) = f0(x),
that is, the initial distribution is given.
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The Gateaux derivative with respect to f is
lim
α→0
d
dα

e−ρtωu

, f + αh

Φ +
d
dα

e−ρt

∂j
∂t
− ρj +Aj

, f + αh

Φ
+
d
dα
p!
k=1

e−ρtλk, (gk − Zk) (f + αh)

Φ + η
d
dα
" ∞
0
e−ρtj (t, x0) [f (t, x0) + αh (t, x0)] dt
=

e−ρtωu

, h

Φ +

e−ρt

∂j
∂t
− ρj +Aj

, h

Φ
+
p!
k=1

e−ρtλk, (gk − Zk)h

Φ
+η
" ∞
0
e−ρtj (t, x0)h (t, x0) dt,
and it equals zero according to Theorem 13. As this is satisified for any h(t, x) we obtain that
∂j
∂t
+ ωu+
p!
k=1
λk (gk − Zk) +Aj + ηjδx0 = ρj, ∀ (t, x) ∈ Φ, (40)
which is the HJB equation of the planner (25).
The Gateaux derivative with respect to the policy μj is
lim
α→0
d
dα

e−ρtωu

x,μj + αh

, f

Φ +
d
dα

e−ρt

∂j
∂t
− ρj +A(μj+αh)j

, f

Φ
(41)
+
d
dα
p!
k=1

e−ρtλk,

gk

x,μj + αh

− Zk

f

Φ ,
where A(μj+αh)j is
A(μj+αh)j =
n!
i=1
bi

x,μ1, ..,μj + αh, ..,μm, Z
 ∂j
∂xi
+
n!
i=1
n!
k=1

σ(x)σ(x)

i,k
2
∂2j
∂xi∂xk
− ηj (t, x) .
It is trivial to check that (41) is equal to the derivative with respect to μj in (40):
μ = argmax
μ˜

ωu (x, μ˜) +
p!
k=1
λkgk (x, μ˜) +A(μ˜)j

. (42)
Finally, the Gateaux derivative with respect to the aggregate variable Zk is
lim
α→0
d
dα

e−ρtj,

−∂f
∂t
+A∗(Zk+αh)f + ηδx0

Φ
+
d
dα
p!
k=1

e−ρtλk, [gk − (Zk + αh)] f

Φ ,
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for any h(t) ∈ L2(0,∞). Again, A∗(Zk+αh) is
A∗(Zk+αh)f = −
n!
i=1
∂
∂xi
[bi (x,μ, Z1, .., Zk + αh, .., Zp) f (t, x)]
+
1
2
n!
i=1
n!
k=1
∂2
∂xi∂xk
#
σ(x)σ(x)

i,k
f (t, x)
$
− ηf (t, x) .
This can be expressed as
lim
α→0
" ∞
0
"
Ω
e−ρtj(t, x)
d
dα

−
n!
i=1
∂
∂xi
[bi (x,μ, Z1, .., Zk + αh, .., Zp) f (t, x)]−
p!
k=1
λk (Zk + αh) f

,
and hence
" ∞
0
e−ρth(t)
"
Ω
j(t, x)

n!
i=1

∂2bi
∂Zk∂xi
f(t, x) +
m!
j=1
∂2bi
∂Zk∂μj
∂μj
∂xi
f +
∂bi
∂Zk
∂f
∂xi

dx+ λk(t)

dt = 0.
As this is satisfied for any h(t), we obtain that
λk(t) = −
"
Ω
j(t, x)

n!
i=1

∂2bi
∂Zk∂xi
f(t, x) +
m!
j=1
∂2bi
∂Zk∂μj
∂μj
∂xi
f(t, x) +
∂bi
∂Zk
∂f
∂xi

dx. (43)
C.3. The social value
Here we show that the Lagrange multiplier j is indeed the social value function, that is, that the
functional J (f (0, ·)) can be represented as
J (f (0, ·)) =
"
Ω
j(0, x)f(0, x)dx.
First we check that, as long as the weighted instantaneous utility is bounded in Φ :
|ω (t, x) u (x,μ (t, x))| ≤M0, ∀ (t, x) ∈ Φ,
the functional J is continuous:
sup
f =0
|J (f)|
fL2(Φ)
< sup
f =0
1
fL2(Φ)
" ∞
0
"
Ω
e−ρt |ω (t, x) u (x,μ (t, x))| f(t, x)dtdx
≤ sup
f =0
M0
fL2(Φ)
" ∞
0
e−ρtds ≤ M0
%
m (Φ)
ρ
,
BANCO DE ESPAÑA 37 DOCUMENTO DE TRABAJO N.º 1533
where the last inequality follows from the Cauchy-Schwartz inequality:
1 =
" b∗
0
fdb = 1, fΦ ≤ fL2(Φ) 1L2(Φ) = fL2(Φ)
&"
Ω
12dx = fL2(Φ)
%
m (Φ),
where m (Φ) is the measure of the domain Φ.
We may then apply the Riesz representation theorem:
J (f (t, ·)) =
"
Ω
j˜(t, x)f(t, x)dx,
where j˜(t, x) ∈ L2 (Φ) is unique.
Now we proceed to show that j˜(t, x) = j(t, x). For any initial condition f(t0, ·), we have an
optimal control path μ and aggregate variables Z.Wemay apply Bellman’s Principle of Optimality:
J (f(t0, ·)) =
" t
t0
e−ρ(s−t0)
"
Ω
ω (s, x) u (x,μ) f(s, b)dxds+ e−ρ(t−t0)J [f(t, ·)] . (44)
Let Ξ (μ, f) be defined as
Ξ (μ, f) ≡
"
Ω
ωufdx.
Taking derivatives with respect to time in equation (44) and the limit as t→ t0:
0 = Ξ (μ, f)− ρJ (f(t, ·)) + ∂
∂t
J (f(t, ·)) = Ξ (μ, f)− ρJ (f(t, ·)) + ∂
∂t
"
Ω
j˜(t, x)f(t, x)dx(45)
= Ξ (μ, f)− ρJ (f(t, ·)) +
"
Ω
j˜(t, x)
∂f
∂t
dx+
"
Ω
∂j˜
∂t
f(t, x)dx
= Ξ (μ, f)−
"
Ω
ρj˜(t, x)f(t, x)dx+
"
Ω
j˜(t, x) (A∗f + ηδx0) dx+
"
Ω
∂j˜
∂t
f(t, x)dx.
For the optimal controls and aggregate variables Z the market clearing conditions (37) are also
satisfied, so we can add them to the expression above, to obtain:
0 = Ξ (μ, f) +
"
Ω

p!
k=1
λk (gk − Zk) f − ρj˜f + j˜A∗f + j˜ηδx0f +
∂j˜
∂t
f

dx. (46)
If we operate on the term
 
Ω j˜(t, x) (A∗f + ηδx0f) dx =

j˜,A∗f + ηδx0f

Φ =
Aj˜ + ηδx0 j˜, f

Φ− 
Ω
j˜ (0, x) f (0, x) dx as in (39) and take the Gateaux derivative with respect to f (t, ·) at both sides
of the expression (46), we obtain
∂j˜
∂t
+ ωu+
p!
k=1
λk (gk − Zk) +Aj˜ + ηj˜δx0 = ρj˜, ∀ (t, x) ∈ Φ,
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which is the same expression as (25). In addition, if we take the Gateaux derivative of (46) with
respect to μ (t, ·) and the standard derivative with respect to Z (t) we obtain again the first order
conditions (42) and the value of λk (43). Hence j˜ = j.
D. Description of the numerical algorithm
Step 1: Solution to the Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equation
The HJB equation is solved by a finite difference scheme following Achdou et al. (2015). It
approximates the value function V (a, z) on a finite grid with steps Δa and Δz : a ∈ {a1, ..., aI} ,
z ∈ {z1, ..., zJ}.26 We use the notation Vi,j ≡ V (ai, zj), i = 1, ..., I; j = 1, ..., J. The derivative of
V with respect to a can be approximated with either a forward or a backward approximation:
∂V (ai, zj)
∂a
≈ ∂a,FVi,j ≡
Vi+1,j − Vi,j
Δa
, (47)
∂V (ai, zj)
∂a
≈ ∂a,BVi,j ≡
Vi,j − Vi−1,j
Δa
, (48)
where the decision between one approximation or the other depends on the sign of the savings
function si,j = wzj + rai − ci,j through an “upwind scheme” described below. The derivative of V
with respect to z is approximated using a forward approximation
∂V (ai, zj)
∂z
≈ ∂zVi,j ≡
Vi,j+1 − Vi,j
Δz
, (49)
∂2V (ai, zj)
∂z2
≈ ∂zzVi,j ≡
Vi,j+1 + Vi,j−1 − 2Vi,j
(Δz)2
. (50)
The HJB equation (25) is
ρˆV = u(c) + (wz + (r − g) a− c) ∂V
∂a
+ θ(zˆ − z)∂V
∂z
+
σ2
2
∂2V
∂z2
,
where
c = (u	)
−1
(
∂V
∂a
),
ρˆ = [(ρ+ η)− (1− γ) g] and u(c) = c1−γ
1−γ in the competitive equilibrium or u(c) =
c1−γ
1−γ +λ (a−K)
26Notice that subindexes i and j have a different meaning here than in the main text.
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in the planning economy. The HJB equation is approximated by an upwind scheme
V n+1i,j − V ni,j
Δ
+ ρˆV n+1i,j = u(c
n
i,j) + ∂a,FV
n+1
i,j s
n
i,j,F1sni,j,F>0 + ∂a,BV
n+1
i,j s
n
i,j,B1sni,j,B<0
+θ(zˆ − zj)∂zV n+1i,j +
σ2zzj
2
∂zzV
n+1
i,j ,
where
sni,j,F = wzj + (r − g) ai − (u	)
−1
(∂a,FV
n
i,j),
sni,j,B = wzj + (r − g) ai − (u	)
−1
(∂a,BV
n
i,j).
Moving all variables with n+1 superscripts to the left hand side and those with n superscripts to
the right hand side:
V n+1i,j − V ni,j
Δ
+ ρˆV n+1i,j = u(c
n
i,j) + V
n+1
i−1,ji,j + V
n+1
i,j βi,j + V
n+1
i+1,jγi,j + V
n+1
i,j−1χj + V
n+1
i,j+1ςj, (51)
where
cni,j = (u
	)
−1
(∂a,FV
n
i,j1sni,j,F>0 + ∂a,BV
n
i,j1sni,j,B<0 + u
	(wzj + rai)1sni,j,F<0,sni,j,B>0), (52)
i,j = −
sni,j,B1sni,j,B<0
Δa
,
βi,j = −
sni,j,F1sni,j,F>0
Δa
+
sni,j,B1sni,j,B<0
Δa
− θ(zˆ − zj)
Δz
− σ
2
(Δz)2
,
γi,j =
sni,j,F1sni,j,F>0
Δa
,
χ =
σ2
2 (Δz)2
,
ςj =
σ2
2 (Δz)2
+
θ(zˆ − zj)
Δz
.
The state constraint (3) a ≥ −φ is enforced by setting sni,j,B = 0. Similarly, snI,j,F = 0. Therefore,
the values V n+10,j and V
n+1
I+1,j are never used. The boundary conditions with respect to z are
∂V (a, z
¯
)
∂z
=
∂V (a, z¯)
∂z
= 0,
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as the process is reflected. At the boundaries in the j dimension, equation (51) becomes
V n+1i,j − V ni,j
Δ
+ ρˆV n+1i,j = u(c
n
i,1) + V
n+1
i−1,ji,1 + V
n+1
i,1

βi,1 + χ

+ V n+1i+1,1γi,1 + V
n+1
i,2 ς1,
V n+1i,j − V ni,j
Δ
+ ρˆV n+1i,j = u(c
n
i,J) + V
n+1
i−1,Ji,J + V
n+1
i,J

βi,J + ςJ

+ V n+1i+1,Jγi,J + V
n+1
i,J−1χJ .
Equation (51) is a system of I×J linear equations which can be written in matrix notation as:
Vn+1 −Vn
Δ
+ ρˆVn+1 = un +AnVn+1,
where the matrix An and the vectors Vn+1 and un are defined by:
An =
⎡
⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣
β1,1 + χ γ1,1 0 · · · 0 ς1 0 0 · · · 0
2,1 β2,1 + χ γ2,1 0 · · · 0 ς1 0 · · · 0
0 3,1 β3,1 + χ γ3,1 0 · · · 0 ς1 · · · 0
...
. . . . . . . . . . . . 0 0 0 · · · 0
0 0 0 I,1 βI,1 + χ γI,1 0 0 · · · 0
χ 0 · · · 0 1,2 β1,2 γ1,2 0 · · · 0
0 χ · · · 0 0 2,2 β2,2 γ2,2 · · · 0
...
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0
0 0 0 0 · · · 0 0 I−1,J βI−1,J + ςJ γI−1,J
0 0 0 0 · · · 0 0 0 I,J βI,I + ςJ
⎤
⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦
,
Vn+1 =
⎡
⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣
V n+11,1
V n+12,1
...
V n+11,2
V n+12,2
...
V n+1I−1,J
V n+1I,J
⎤
⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦
, un =
⎡
⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣
u(cn1,1)
u(cn2,1)
...
u(cn1,2)
u(cn2,2)
...
u(cnI−1,J)
u(cnI,J)
⎤
⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦
.
Th t i t b itt
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where Bn=

1
Δ + ρˆ

I−An and dn = un + VnΔ . I is the identity matrix.
27
The algorithm to solve the HJB equation runs as follows. Begin with an initial guess V 0i,j =
u(rai + wzj)/ρ, set n = 0. Then:
1. Compute ∂a,FV ni,j, ∂a,BV
n
i,j, ∂zV
n
i,j and ∂zzV
n
i,j using (47)-(50).
2. Compute cni,j using (52).
3. Find V n+1i,j solving the linear system of equations (53).
4. If V n+1i,j is close enough to V
n
i,j, stop. If not set n := n+ 1 and go to step 1.
Step 2: Solution to the Kolmogorov Forward equation
The KF equation is also solved using an upwind finite difference scheme. The equation (6) in this
case is
0 = − ∂
∂a
[(wz + (r − g) a− c) f ]− ∂
∂z
[θ(zˆ − z)f ] + 1
2
∂2
∂z2
σ2f − ηf + ηδ0, (54)
"
f(a, z)dadz = 1. (55)
This case is simpler than the previous one, as the problem is linear in f , so no iterative procedure
is needed. We use the notation fi,j ≡ f(ai, zj). The system can be expressed as
0 = −
fi,js
n
i,j,F1sni,j,F>0 − fi−1,js
n
i−1,j,F1sni−1,j,F>0
Δa
−
fi+1,js
n
i+1,j,B1sni+1,j,B<0 − fi,js
n
i,j,B1sni,j,B<0
Δa
−fi,jη(zj)− fi,j−1η(zj−1)
Δz
+
fi,j+1σ2z(zj+1) + fi,j−1σ
2
z(zj−1)− 2fi,jσ2z(zj)
2 (Δz)2
− ηfi,j + ηδ0,
or equivalently
fi−1,jγi−1,j + fi+1,ji+1,j + fi,jβi,j + fi,j+1χ+ fi,j−1ςj − ηfi,j = −ηδ0, (56)
then (56) is also a system of I × J linear equations which can be written in matrix notation as:

AT − ηI

f = h, (57)
27In optimal planning solution the first element of the matrix Bn is

1
Δ + ρˆ

−

β1,1 + χ1

− η due to the term
ηjδ (a+ φ) δ (z − z
¯
) in equation (29).
The system can in turn be written as
BnVn+1 = dn, (53)
BANCO DE ESPAÑA 42 DOCUMENTO DE TRABAJO N.º 1533
where AT is the transpose of A = limn→∞An and h is a vector of zeros with a −1 at the first
position. We solve the system (57) and obtain a solution fˆ . Then we renormalize as
fi,j =
fˆi,jI
i=1
J
j=1 fˆi,jΔaΔz
.
Step 3: Finding the equilibrium aggregate capital
In order to find the aggregate capital k, we employ a relaxation method. Given θ ∈ (0, 1), begin
with an initial guess of the aggregate capital k0, set n = 0. Then:
1. Compute rn and wn using (11).
2. Given rn and wn, solve the planner’s HJB equation as in Step 1 to obtain an estimate of the
value function V n and of the consumption cn.
3. Given cn, solve the KF equation as in Step 2 and compute the aggregate distribution fn.
4. Compute the aggregate capital stock S =
I
i=1
J
j=1 aifi,jΔaΔz.
5. Compute kn+1 = θSn + (1− θ) kn. If kn+1 is close enough to kn, stop. If not set n := n+ 1
and go to step 1.
Step 4: Finding the Lagrange multiplier (only in the optimal allocation)
In order to find the value of the optimal Lagrange multiplier in the planning problem (38), we
begin with an initial guess λ0 = 0, then we need to find the value of λ that satisfies
λ =
α (1− α)
k2−α
I!
i=1
J!
j=1

fi,j + ai
fi+1,j − fi,j
Δa
− kzj
fi+1,j − fi,j
Δa

Vi,jΔaΔz,
where fi,j, k, and Vi,j are obtained by solving the planner’s problem with this value of λ and utility
u(c) = c
1−γ
1−γ + λ (a−K) .
28 We employ Matlab’s routine fzero to find this value of λ.
28V is the value function of the planner in this case, that we denote as j(a, z) in the main text.
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